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THE BREAK-UP OF BRITAIN? SCOTLAND
AND THE END OF EMPIRE
The Prothero Lecture
By T. M. Devine
READ 6 JULY 2005
ABSTRACT. The essay is concerned with the retreat from the British empire and
specifically with the Scottish aspects of that process. It is now acknowledged that
the Scottish role in the imperial project was central. Hence there is a special interest
in tracing the response to the end of empire north of the border. Several historians
and political scientists have argued that imperial decline was likely to destroy one
of the key foundations of the Anglo-Scottish Union. This essay challenges these
assumptions by demonstrating that imperial decline failed to produce much political
concern in Scotland. The possible reasons for this are considered.
I
Most of the great territorial empires in world history have broken up
slowly over several generations of decline and decay. This was not so in
the case of Britain. As late as 1945 its empire was still virtually intact with
British rule extending across the oceans of the globe and populations
of around 700 million people. A mere two decades later, this figure had
fallen to 5 million of which 3 million were concentrated in Hong Kong.
In June 1997, even that last major outpost of empire was handed back to
the Chinese when the Black Watch played Auld Lang Syne as the Union
Jack was lowered over the territory for the very last time.
The end of empire was not only rapid, it was also remarkably peaceful.
True, there were outbreaks of nationalist hostility in Cyprus, Aden and
Kenya during the imperial retreat. But in Britain itself all was calm.
Indeed, as several scholars have noted, the British seem to have accepted
the collapse of their empire with an equanimity bordering on indifference.
Here contrasts are often drawn with the experience of France and
Portugal. Both had much smaller empires than the British in Africa, Asia
and Indo-China. Yet in these two countries decolonisation was followed
by social trauma and political convulsion at home.1
1 John Darwin, The End of the British Empire. The Historical Debate (Oxford, 1991), 1–4, 34–5;
idem, Britain and Decolonisation (1988), 324, 328; The Oxford History of the British Empire. The
Twentieth Century, ed. Judith M. Brown and W. R. Lewis (Oxford, 1999), 330, 706.
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In one important sense the relative silence in Britain, outside the right
wing of the Conservative Party, is intriguing. As the break-up of empire
loomed, some commentators predicted that imperial decline must place
considerable strain on the Anglo-Scottish Union. As early as 1937, Andrew
Dewar Gibb, Professor of Constitutional Law in the University of Glasgow
and a prominent nationalist with deep imperial sympathies, noted in
his Scottish Empire that ‘The existence of the Empire has been the most
important factor in securing the relationship of Scotland and England
in the last three centuries.’2 He implied that without empire this ancient
political connection might not stand the test of time. Similarly in his last
work, Sir Reginald Coupland, a distinguished imperial historian of the
old school, considered the potential rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalism
in the aftermath of decolonisation and gloomily concluded that Ireland
might not be the last of the nations of the British Isles to leave the United
Kingdom.3
This theme was taken up even more vigorously in the 1960s and 1970s
as the Scottish National Party (SNP) began to achieve its first spectacular
successes in elections. Commentators as varied as H. J. Hanham, Jan
Morris and Tom Nairn outlined a possible relationship between the end
of empire and dissolution of the Union. Hanham’s Scottish Nationalism,
published in 1969, two years after Winnie Ewing’s sensational by-election
SNP victory at Hamilton, observed:
Now that the Empire is dead many Scots feel cramped and restricted at home. They chafe
at the provincialism of much of Scottish life and at the slowness of Scottish economic
growth, which is related to that provincialism. To give themselves an opening to a wider
world the Scots need some sort of outlet, and the choice appears at the moment to be
between emigration and re-creating the Scottish nation at home.4
For Jan Morris, an author who had written extensively about the British
empire, there was no longer much scope for a shared pride between the
nations of the United Kingdom with the acceleration of decolonisation.
All that remained in the Union, she remarked memorably, was ‘this
grubby wreck of old glories’ in which few could take any satisfaction.
Hence, the time was ripe for a new constitutional beginning.5 It was
then left to the Marxist writer, Tom Nairn, in 1977 to provide a full-scale
analysis of those issues. For him, the break-up of Britain was not only
inevitable but necessary as a constructive response to the crisis in the
Union triggered by the end of empire.6
2 Andrew Dewar Gibb, Scottish Empire (1937), 311.
3 Sir Reginald Coupland, Welsh and Scottish Nationalism (1954), xv, 12, 13.
4 H. J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (1969), 212.
5 Daily Telegraph, 24 Feb. 1979, cited in Keith Robbins, ‘“This Grubby Wreck of Old
Glories”: The United Kingdom and the End of the British Empire’, Journal of Contemporary
History, 15 (1980), 84.
6 Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain (1977), 118–20.
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These observers and others had, on the face of it, a plausible case. The
British empire was seen traditionally as a vital economic cement of Union
as, for the Scots from the later eighteenth century onwards, the empire
provided a remarkable set of opportunities in trade, the professions,
military service and administration for the Scottish upper and middle
classes while the entire production structure of Scottish industry from
the age of cotton to the era of heavy industry was built around imperial
markets.7 Since the empire supplied a powerful material rationale for
Union, it therefore seemed attractive to argue that with its disappearance
the economic anchor which had for so long bound Scotland to England
could easily also be cut adrift. This point was apparently given added
force by the analysis of Tom Nairn, George Davie and others of the
long-run history of nationalism in Scotland. For them the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were an epoch of profound crisis for Scottish
nationhood. In Europe during these decades the Scots were out of step
as, throughout the continent, small historic nations asserted their rights to
self-determination and independence. In Scotland, however, nationalism
in this form was conspicuous by its absence. Their argument is that the
Scottish professional and mercantile elites were seduced by the glittering
prizes of empire, selling in the process their distinctive identity and ancient
autonomy for a share of the imperial spoils. With decolonisation, on the
other hand, nationalist aspirations could once again come to the fore.8
As John Mackenzie has put it in his commentary on this argument:
With the end of Empire the Scots could at last escape from their self-interested complicity
and reunite nation with state after the dramatic rupture of that particular Union. With
the loss of the colonies, the imperial cataracts can be removed from the eyes of the
imperial collaborators and a new democratic dispensation can be discerned emerging
from which the national opthamologist can free the Scots as much as the subordinate
peoples of the white settler territories, India and the dependant empire.9
Thus far, however, more than fifty years after the independence of
India, the dire predictions of the disintegration of the Union have proven
to be false. Indeed, arguably it is more secure now than it has been
at any time since the late 1960s and 1970s when Scottish nationalism
seemed to have achieved an unstoppable momentum. In 2005 the SNP is
becalmed with less than 20 per cent of the popular vote in Scotland and
the pro-Union parties are in the ascendant in the Scottish parliament.10
7 T. M. Devine, Scotland’s Empire 1600–1815 (2003); idem, Scotland’s Empire and the Shaping of
the Americas (Washington, 2003); Michael Fry, The Scottish Empire (Edinburgh, 2001).
8 Nairn, Break-Up, 162; R. J. Finlay, ‘Controlling the Past: Scottish Historiography and
Scottish Identity in the 19th and 20th centuries’, Scottish Affairs, 9 (1994), 127–43.
9 John M. Mackenzie, ‘A Scottish Empire? The Scottish Diaspora and Interactive
Identities’, in The Heather and the Fern. Scottish Migration and New Zealand Settlement,
ed. T. Brooking and J. Coleman (Otago, 2003), 19.
10 Lindsay Paterson et al., New Scotland, New Politics? (Edinburgh, 2001), 83–100.
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George Robertson, a former secretary of state for Scotland and director-
general of NATO, famously observed that devolution would kill Scottish
political nationalism stone dead. Whether this is a correct diagnosis or
not, it is still tolerably clear that the advent of a Scottish parliament has
not precipitated a headlong rush to full independence, despite the fears
of many Unionists.
In truth, of course, the Union was itself transformed by the devolution
of important powers to Edinburgh in 1999. But any direct or convincing
link between the end of empire and the new constitutional settlement has
yet to be demonstrated. Political scientists and modern Scottish historians
have tended to look elsewhere for the root causes of devolution and have
found them in the disenchantment felt in Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s
when both Tory and Labour, the two ‘Unionist’ parties, were incapable
of delivering long-term economic and social benefit as UK governments
struggled against recurrent currency crises and the menace of rising
inflation.11 However, these pressures were not yet enough to trigger
general hostility in Scotland to the terms of the constitutional relationship
with England, as the failed referendum on a Scottish Assembly in 1979
made clear. Only in the 1990s did such a consensus emerge. Then it was
fashioned not by any nostalgia for lost imperial glory but by the profound
economic crises of the 1980s, the ‘democratic deficit’ caused by the
cleavage between Scottish and English voting patterns and perhaps,
above all, by growing opposition to the social policies of a succession
of Conservative governments. Mrs Thatcher has an infinitely greater
claim to be the midwife of Scottish devolution than the factor of imperial
decline.12
Indeed, historically, Scottish Home Rule and empire were not
incompatible. The first search for some form of devolution for Scotland
took place in the late nineteenth century at the high noon of the British
empire and was seen by its protagonists as a means to ensuring that the
governance of empire might be improved. This was not just a theoretical
discussion. A series of Home Rule Acts were promulgated between the
1880s and 1914. In 1913 the policy had secured widespread agreement
and was merely awaiting parliamentary time and the solution of the Irish
question. The outbreak of the First World War, however, put paid to this
aspiration.13
There is also the problem of chronology in associating the rise of
Scottish political nationalism with imperial decline in the 1940s and 1950s.
The Scots mainly identified with the colonies of white settlement, Canada,
11 I. G. C. Hutchison, Scottish Politics in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 2001), 121–2;
Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Glasgow, 1977), 85–90.
12 T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700–2000 (1999), 604–5.
13 Fry, Empire, 380, 388, 496; Webb, Nationalism, 87.
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South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. These were the countries which
had experienced mass Scottish immigration since the eighteenth century.
Ties of kindred, friendship and identity with them were close. But these
dominions had enjoyed autonomy since the Statute of Westminster in
1931 while at the same time retaining a symbolic and sentimental form of
attachment to the mother country through the British Commonwealth
of Nations. The process of decolonisation in Asia and Africa after 1945,
which was chronologically closer to the rise of the SNP, evoked little
protest or opposition in Scotland. On the contrary, the Church of Scotland
vigorously supported the cause of black nationalism in Africa and, through
its annual General Assembly, criticised the government for not conceding
independence more quickly.14 The position of the Church on this issue was
deeply significant. To a much greater extent than today it was a national
church with a membership which historically reached an all-time high
in the late 1950s. Traditionally, in this stateless nation, the Church of
Scotland was regarded as a kind of surrogate parliament which spoke for
the country on matters of contemporary political and social importance
as well as religious issues through its General Assembly. The proceedings
of this body were then widely reported and discussed in the Scottish
press.15
II
We are therefore left with a conundrum. Historians claim that Scotland
was heavily involved with the imperial project, yet the passing of empire
seems to have had little perceptible consequence on the nation. Certainly
the anticipated causal relationship between the end of empire and the
dissolution of the Union has proven thus far to be fallacious. One possible
way of resolving the puzzle is to question the very premise that the
British empire was of central significance to the British people. This
view has a long pedigree. Some time ago, for instance, the novelist,
H. G. Wells, famously remarked that nineteen Englishmen out of twenty
knew as much about the British empire as they did about the Italian
Renaissance.16 Historians as different as Max Beloff and A. J. P. Taylor
also insisted that imperialism was on the whole an irrelevant factor in the
lives of most Britons.17 From a similar perspective James Morris argued
14 T. Royle, Winds of Change. The End of Empire in Africa (1996), 231; R. Ferguson, George
MacLeod (1990), 299.
15 Callum Brown, The Social History of Religion in Scotland since 1730 (1987), 209–47.
16 Bill Nasson, Brittania’s Empire. Making a British World (Stroud, 2004), 208.
17 John M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire (Manchester, 1984), 1.
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that few people in the United Kingdom found the empire of any great
significance or interest.18
More recently, however, the most powerful and detailed exploration
of this thesis has come from the pen of Bernard Porter in The Absent-
Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (2004). Despite its
subtitle, Porter’s focus is almost entirely Anglocentric. In 108 pages of
end-notes and 30 pages of ‘select’ bibliography, there is only one article
with a Scottish emphasis. Essentially, therefore, it is for English historians
to judge the overall validity of his argument. But Porter’s general thesis
hardly convinces in a specific Scottish context. Far from being a marginal
factor in the nation’s domestic history, empire was crucial to the Scottish
experience during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeed, one
author has recently claimed that so fundamental to the moulding of the
modern nation was the British empire that it should rank alongside the
Reformation, the Union of 1707 and the Enlightenment as one of the
truly seminal developments in Scottish history.19 So intense was Scottish
engagement with empire that it had an impact on almost every nook and
cranny of Scottish life over these two centuries: economy, identity, politics,
intellectual activity, popular culture, consumerism, religion, demographic
trends and much else.20
In the eighteenth century the colonial tobacco and sugar trades were
two of the key drivers of Scottish industrialisation while during the
Victorian and Edwardian eras the Scottish heavy industrial economy
was strongly biased towards export markets and the principal outlets for
ships, locomotives and engineering products were the British colonies.21
Dundee, one of Scotland’s four principal cities, became ‘Juteopolis’, its
booming textile industry founded on the importation of raw jute from
India. Gordon Stewart, later an historian who went on to write an
important study of jute, recalled the imperial connections of his native
city:
I grew up in Dundee and I thought that the Scottish city was the centre of the world jute
trade. This impression was dinned into me by my geography lessons at school and by
a host of childhood encounters with jute. When I felt depressed by the drabness of life
amidst the row of identical, rain-stained buildings on the housing scheme where I lived,
I would pedal my bike down to the docks and watch hundreds of bales of jute being
unloaded from the holds of great cargo steamers which had sailed half-way round the
world from Chittagong and Calcutta. On the way home from school I would sit on city
buses crowded with women workers coming off their shifts with wisps of jute sticking
18 James Morris, ‘The Popularisation of Imperial History’, Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 1 (1973), 113–18.
19 Fry, Empire, 498.
20 John M. Mackenzie, ‘Essay and Reflection: On Scotland and Empire’, International
History Review, 15 (1993), 714–39.
21 Devine, Empire, 69–93, 221–49; M. S. Moss and J. R. Hume, Workshop of the British
Empire. Engineering and Shipbuilding in the West of Scotland (1977).
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to their hair and clothes and their hands roughened red by the handling of jute in the
factories . . . Because of the names on the sterns of the cargo ships and the faces of the
crewmen, I understood there was an Indian dimension to jute. I also learned of this
connection by listening to family stories about relatives and friends of my parents who
had spent time in India.22
In Glasgow, the economic connections were equally deep. It arrogated
to itself the description ‘Second City of the Empire’ (a term first
used as early as 1824) while the broader west of Scotland region was
celebrated as ‘The Workshop of the British Empire’. Scottish society
more generally had strong ties to empire. As one author has put it, the
Scots professional and middle classes claimed ‘not merely a reasonable
but a quite indecent share of the [imperial] spoils’.23 Throughout the
eighteenth and for much of the nineteenth centuries, Scottish educators,
physicians, soldiers, administrators, missionaries, engineers, scientists and
merchants relentlessly penetrated every corner of the empire and beyond
so that when the statistical record for virtually any area of professional
employment is examined, Scots are seen to be over-represented.24
This elite emigration was but one element in a greater mass diaspora
from Scotland. Between 1825 and 1938 over 2.3 million Scots left their
homeland for overseas destinations. This placed the country with Ireland
and Norway in the top three of European countries with the highest levels
of net emigration throughout that period. The emigrants had three main
destinations – USA (after 1783), British North America (which became
the Dominion of Canada in 1867) and Australia. After c. 1840 the USA
was the choice of most who left but Canada predominated in the early
twentieth century. Also in the 1850s Australia, for a period, was taking
more Scots than each of the two North American countries considered
individually.25 These huge levels of emigration generated a vast network of
family and individual connections with the colonies and dominions which
were consolidated by return migration (in one estimate averaging more
than 40 per cent of the total exodus in the 1890s), chain migration, letter
correspondence and widespread coverage of the emigrant experience in
Scottish popular press and periodical literature.26
The British empire also had a potent influence on Scottish national
consciousness and identity. Several recent analyses have emphasised that
22 Gordon Stewart, Jute and Empire (Manchester, 1998), ix.
23 D. Allan, Scotland in the Eighteenth Century (Harlow, 2002), 185.
24 Devine, Empire, xxv–xxvii.
25 M. Gray, ‘The Course of Scottish Emigration, 1750–1914: Enduring Influences and
Changing Circumstances’, in Scottish Emigration and Scottish Society, ed. T. M. Devine
(Edinburgh, 1992), 16–36.
26 M. Harper, Emigration from Scotland between the Wars (Manchester, 1998), 6–13; idem,
Adventurers and Exiles (London, 2003), 237–81; idem, ‘Introduction’, in Emigrant Homecomings:
The Return Movement of Emigrants, 1600–2000, ed. M. Harper (Manchester, 2005), 1–15.
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for the Scots elite in the years before 1914 nationalism was not in conflict
with the Union but rather was integrated closely with it. The empire
was the means by which the Scots asserted their equal partnership with
England after 1707. By the Victorian era it was commonplace to assert that
substantial imperial expansion only occurred after the Union and hence
was a joint endeavour in which the Scots had played a full part.27 This
was no empty boast. Scottish publicists, through such works as John Hill
Burton’s The Scots Abroad (2 vols., 1864) and W. J. Rattray’s monumental
four-volume magnum opus, The Scot in British North America (1880), were
easily able to demonstrate the mark that Scottish education (especially at
college and university level), presbyterianism, medicine, trading networks
and philosophical enquiry had had on the colonies.28 Pride in the Scottish
achievement was taken even further by those who saw the Scottish people
as a race of natural empire-builders. Thus the nationalist Andrew Dewar
Gibb argued in 1930:
the position of Scotland as a Mother nation of the Empire is at all costs to be preserved
to her. England and Scotland occupy a unique position as the begetters and defenders
of the Empire. They alone of all the Aryan peoples in it have never been otherwise than
sovereign and independent. Ireland and Wales, mere satrapies of England, can claim
no comparable place. Scotsmen today are occupying places both eminent and humble
throughout the Empire, and Scottish interests are bound up with every colony in it.29
Nonetheless, it might be objected that the argument thus far ignores the
important factor of differences in the attitudes of social class to empire.
Bernard Porter in The Absent-Minded Imperialists focuses especially on this
aspect. He sees the upper and middles classes as most committed to the
imperial project while the working classes were ‘either apathetic towards
the empire or superficial in their attitude to it’. Porter also claims a deep
ignorance about the empire on the part of the majority of the British
people.30
Again, this interpretation hardly fits the Scottish case. While it is
impossible, of course, in the current state of knowledge to determine
in precise terms what the ordinary Scot thought about empire it
is nevertheless unlikely that the words ‘apathy’ and ‘ignorance’ are
appropriate terms to use of public opinion. Exposure to imperial themes
started early in Scotland. In 1907 the Scottish Education Department
in its memorandum on the teaching of history in schools directed that
27 R. J. Finlay, ‘The Rise and Fall of Popular Imperialism in Scotland, 1850–1950’, Scottish
GeographicalMagazine, 113 (1997), 13–21; John M. Mackenzie, ‘Empire and National Identities.
The Case of Scotland’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, sixth series, 8 (1998), 215–32.
28 David S. Forsyth, ‘Empire and Union: Imperialism and National Identity in Nineteenth
Century Scotland’, Scottish Geographical Magazine, 113 (1997), 6–12.
29 A. D. Gibb, Scotland in Eclipse (1930), 187.
30 Bernard Porter,The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford,
2004), 115–33.
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the curriculum should develop from the study of Scotland to British and
international themes but always throughout stressing the nation’s role in
the empire. Text books embodying this approach were soon available
in schools and the most popular was Cormack’s Caledonia Readers which
placed emphasis on empire. As Robert Anderson has shown, the British
empire had a key part to play in late nineteenth-century history teaching
because it provided the kind of blend of British and Scottish history which
reflected Scotland’s position in the Union state.31
But this was not all. The 1900s also saw the celebration of Empire Day
in schools when flags were exchanged between Scottish schools and those
elsewhere in the empire. The stories of such imperial heroes as General
Gordon, Sir Colin Campbell (of Indian Mutiny fame), the missionary
Mary Slessor and, above all, David Livingstone would have been very
well known to Scottish schoolchildren.32 Biographies of Livingstone, the
‘Protestant Saint’ and the most famous and venerated Scotsman of the
nineteenth century, were widely read and also awarded as prizes in schools
and Sunday Schools, a practice which continued unabated through to
the 1960s.33 Of course it was not simply children who were taught to
respond to these imperial heroes. They were also celebrated by the trade
union movement, working men’s clubs and Labour politicians, such as
Keir Hardie, as models of Scottish virtue and exemplars for the nation.
Knowledge of and loyalty to empire was also communicated by such
organisations as the Junior Empire League with around 20,000 members
and the Boys’ Brigade. This last was formed in Glasgow in 1883 and not
only promoted Christian values but also inculcated fidelity to the imperial
ideal within its membership. The ‘BBs’ became enormously popular
among ordinary young Scots boys well into the twentieth century.34
Among the mass of the population, however, perhaps the main symbols
of empire were the Scottish regiments. Recognised as the spearheads of
imperial expansion, and widely celebrated in music, story, painting and
statue as the tartan-clad icons of the Scottish nation, they enjoyed, as
Stuart Allan and Allan Carswell have put it, ‘unchallenged prominence in
Scottish society as symbols of national self-image’.35 Ironically, despite the
fame of the Highland soldier, the kilted battalions were mainly recruited
during the Victorian age from the working class of the Scottish cities.
Their exploits were widely reported not simply in the popular press but
31 R. D. Anderson, Education and the Scottish People 1750–1918 (Oxford, 1995), 212–13, 218–19.
32 Ibid., 218–19.
33 Andrew C. Ross, ‘Christian Missions and the Mid-Nineteenth-Century Change in
Attitudes. Race: The African Experience’, in The Imperial Horizons of the British Protestant
Missions, 1880–1914, ed. Andrew Porter (2003), 102–3.
34 Mackenzie, ‘Identities’, 226.
35 Stuart Allan and Allan Carswell, The Thin Red Line. War, Empire and Visions of Scotland
(Edinburgh, 2004), 40.
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in such famous paintings as The Thin Red Line. The regiments made
a remarkable impact on Scottish consciousness. Seen as the heirs of a
martial national tradition which went back for centuries, they also acted as
important catalysts for the wide diffusion of the military ethic throughout
the country.36 One major spin-off was the Volunteer movement which
developed into a permanent reserve force for the army and attracted
many thousands of young Scotsmen. The Volunteers were a focus for
local pride but they also strongly identified with the British empire.
Both the Volunteers and the Boys’ Brigade adopted army ranks and
nomenclature, undertook military drill and were regularly inspected by
army officers. The important influence of both organisations goes a long
way to explaining the exceptional scale of voluntary recruitment into the
army in Scotland when war broke out in 1914.37 More generally, the fame
and significance of the Scottish military tradition lives on even to the
present day as illustrated by the extraordinary and continuing success
of the Edinburgh Military Tattoo and political controversies during the
2005 General Election over the proposed reorganisation of the historic
Scottish regiments.
III
There therefore seems on the face of it to be a huge gap between
the imperial enthusiasms of the nineteenth century and the apparent
equanimity with which Scotland accepted decolonisation in the middle
decades of the twentieth century. It will be argued here that the crucial
period for understanding this transformation in attitude to empire
occurred between the 1920s and 1950s, despite the fact that imperial
sentiment did not entirely fade away during these decades.
There is, after all, plenty of evidence of continuity in the years after
1918. The massive war losses suffered by Scotland, officially counted at
74,000 but unofficially reckoned to be over 110,000, were commemorated
in the Scottish National War Memorial, completed in Edinburgh Castle in
1927. It was not simply a remarkable tribute in stone to the nation’s fallen
but also to the sons and grandsons of Scotland from the empire. The Roll
of Honour included all those who had served in Scottish regiments and in
those of the dominions overseas, eloquent affirmation of the continuing
importance of the imperial bond.38 The link between empire and the
36 Devine, Empire, 290–319; Heather Streets, ‘Identity in the Highland Regiments in the
Nineteenth Century; Soldier, Region, Nation’, in Fighting for Identity. The Scottish Military
Experience c. 1550–1900, ed. S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop (Leiden, 2002).
37 H. J. Hanham, ‘Religion and Nationality in the Mid-Victorian Army’, in War and
Society, ed. M. R. D. Foot (1973), 173.
38 E. W. McFarland, ‘Introduction: “A Coronach in Stone”’, in Scotland and the Great War,
ed. Catriona M. M. Macdonald and E. W. McFarland (East Lothian, 1999), 1–2.
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nation Church also seemed intact. The cult of David Livingstone reached
its apotheosis in the 1920s when many small donations by ordinary Scots
financed the creation of the Livingstone Memorial Centre in Blantyre,
Lanarkshire, in the cotton mill complex where the legendary explorer
and missionary had worked as a boy. The Centre remained a place of
pilgrimage for schools and Sunday Schools until the 1950s.39 The public
face of imperial Scotland seemed also to have changed little. A great
imperial exhibition was held in Glasgow in 1938, the fourth in a series
which since the 1890s had attracted literally millions of visitors.40 As late
as 1951 a colonial week was held in the same city. Empire was also still very
much on the political agenda. In the inter-war years factional arguments
raged in the Scottish nationalist movement over the nature of the
relationship which a self-governing Scotland would have with the empire.
Even the Labour Party temporarily diluted earlier hostility and some of
its leading intellectuals in Scotland, including John Wheatley, argued that
through the empire could come not only economic regeneration but also
the hope of protecting a socialist Britain from the menace of international
capitalism.41
In some ways, however, all this was a mirage, a false image of continuity
after the trauma of the Great War. Andrew Dewar Gibb in 1937 recognised
the change. With the granting of dominion status to the colonies of white
settlement, he observed ‘the hegemony of Britain in the Empire is steadily
becoming more formal and more ornamental’.42 Popular imperialism
also waned. Scholars now regard the Glasgow Empire Exhibition of 1938
not so much as a catalyst for regenerating imperial enthusiasms as an
event of mere nostalgic significance.43 Iain Hutchison has also noted
that in the 1945 election both Scottish Tory and Labour candidates
referred even less frequently in their manifestos to imperial themes
than their English counterparts.44 This was a symbolic and ominous
prelude to the results of that election, when the Unionists, par excellence
the party of empire, were roundly defeated by Labour which had a quite
different set of political and social priorities for the future governance of
Scotland.
The traditional career route of middle-class Scots into imperial
administration was crumbling. In this respect the Indian Civil Service
39 John M. Mackenzie, ‘David Livingstone: The Construction of the Myth’, in Sermons
and Battle Hymns: Protestant Popular Culture in Modern Scotland, ed. G. Walker and T. Gallagher
(Edinburgh, 1990), 24–42.
40 P. Kinchin and J. Kinchin, Glasgow’s Great Exhibitions (Bicester, 1988).
41 R. J. Finlay, ‘“For or Against?”: Scottish Nationalists and the British Empire, 1919–39’,
Scottish Historical Review, 71 (1992), 184–206; Finlay, ‘Imperialism’, 20.
42 Gibb, Eclipse, 187.
43 B. Crampsey, The Empire Exhibition of 1938: The Last Durbar (Edinburgh, 1988).
44 Hutchison, Politics, 121–2.
174 transactions of the royal historical society
(ICS) had long enjoyed pre-eminence in the rank order of colonial
administrations. By 1939, Scots accounted for 13 per cent of the Europeans
on the ICS books.45 This was still marginally greater than the Scottish
proportion of UK population. Nonetheless, this was a significantly lower
ratio than in the eighteenth and for much of the nineteenth centuries.
Indeed, Anthony Kirk-Greene suggests that demoralisation was rampant
in the ICS after 1918 because of a perceived decline in its career prospects
as Indian self-government became a likely prospect. Though recruitment
to the service did not dry up, the ICS was confronted with what has been
described a critical shortage of satisfactory recruits from Britain which
became especially acute from the 1920s.46
Scottish elite families were still exporting their male progeny but
were no longer constrained to the same extent by opportunities within
the formal empire. The great Scottish business syndicates of Jardine,
Matheson and Co., the Hongkong and Shangai Bank, Burmah Oil
Company, Guthries and Company and several others had become global
rather than simply imperial corporations. The USA, Latin America,
China and Japan all provided rich pickings for ambitious and educated
Scots. They no longer, if they ever had, felt themselves restricted by
imperial frontiers.47 Above all, career goals were still more easily satisfied
in London than in faraway places. Historians have been more interested
in the exotic and have therefore tended to concentrate on the Scottish
transoceanic experience. In truth, the London financial and business
world had always been crucial.48 The modern ‘Scottish Raj’ in the
UK cabinet and the high-profile Scottish presence in the British media
is simply the latest variant in a trend which goes back for many
generations.
IV
No single cause conspired to erode Scotland’s emotional attachment to
empire. But the profound crisis which overwhelmed the nation in the
period between the world wars in the twentieth century was a major
factor. To understand this fully, however, it is necessary to describe the
context of the long-term relationship between the Scottish economy
and empire in the Victorian and Edwardian era. Such a perspective
strongly suggests that the disastrous inter-war experience was the
culmination of structural weaknesses which reached much further back in
time.
45 A. Kirk-Greene, Britain’s Imperial Administrators 1858–1966 (Basingstoke, 2000), 17.
46 Ibid., 88.
47 R. A. Cage, The Scots Abroad. Labour, Capital, Enterprise, 1750–1914 (1985).
48 Devid Stenhouse, On the Make. How the Scots took over London (Edinburgh, 2004).
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Certainly the close connections with imperial markets helped to
boost productive capacity enormously in Scotland. One very significant
consequence was a marked increase in Scottish population due to the
economy’s creation of more employment opportunities for the new
generation. Thus, in 1701, Scotland had a total population of around
1.1 million. By 1831 the figure stood at 2.3 million and in 1911 had
reached 4.7 million. Further confirmation of the dynamic nature of
the economic system was the massive increase in immigration in the
Victorian era, most notably from Ireland, but also including significant
numbers of Italians, Jews and Lithuanians. This level of immigration
over such a short period was something quite new in Scottish history
and testimony to the economy’s capacity to generate more employment
opportunities.
Again, trading with the empire made some Scots very rich indeed.
A handful of families amassed colossal fortunes. Sir Charles Tenant of
the chemical empire, William Baird, the ironmaster, Sir James and Peter
Coats of the threadmaking dynasty and William Weir, colliery owner and
iron manufacturer, were among the forty individuals in Britain reckoned
to be worth £2 million or more in the nineteenth century. Recent
research has shown that the super-rich were also as well represented
in Scotland as in any other part of the United Kingdom.49 In addition
to these fabulously wealthy but exceptional tycoons there were the solid
ranks of the prosperous middle classes who ranged in occupational status
from highly paid professionals such as lawyers to small businessmen and
senior clerks. In his analysis of national income, published in 1867, the
Victorian economist, R. Dudley Baxter, reckoned that 267,300 people
were in this group in Scotland, had an annual income of between £100
and £1,000 and represented nearly one fifth of the total number of
what he termed ‘productive persons’ in the country. The impact of
the spending of this middle class could be seen in the elegant suburbs
which blossomed around the major cities in the nineteenth century:
Broughty Ferry near Dundee, the graceful terraces of the West End
of Glasgow and the substantial villas of Newington and Corstorphine in
Edinburgh.50
The increases in the outflow of capital from Scotland after 1870
were also in part a reflection of the increases in savings among the
Scottish middle classes. Most of this came through Scottish solicitors and
chartered accountants raising funds on behalf of overseas clients from
professional and business families at home. It was said that Edinburgh in
49 W. D. Rubenstein, ‘The Victorian Middle Classes: Wealth, Occupation and
Geography’, Economic History Review, second series, 30 (1977), 609–11, 614.
50 Stena Nenadic, ‘The Victorian Middle Classes’, in Glasgow, II : 1830 to 1912, ed. W. H.
Fraser and I. Maver (Manchester, 1996), 271–2.
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the 1880s was ‘honeycombed’ with agents of these companies who were
the main channel for this substantial mobilisation of middle-class capital.51
Certainly, Scottish middle incomes were on average fewer and lower than
London and the metropolitan areas of the south but in the early twentieth
century on a par with the major English industrial centres in Lancashire
and Yorkshire. These regions, however, hardly compared with Scottish
levels of overseas investment, one of the most telling manifestations of
the new wealth. These grew from an estimated £60 million in 1870 to
£500 million by 1914. Not all of this went to the imperial territories –
land, mining and railway developments in the USA were also major
beneficiaries – but much did. In the 1880s it was reckoned that three-
quarters of the British companies established for overseas investment
were of Scottish origin. Nearly half of all Australian borrowing in
the late nineteenth century came from Scotland. Tea planting in
Ceylon, jute production in India and railways in the Canadian West
also benefited. One estimate for 1914 suggested that the value of
overseas investment was equivalent to £110 for every Scot compared
to the average of £90 for the United Kingdom as a whole.52 Here
was unambiguous confirmation that Scotland’s imperial economy had
indeed generated huge increases in capital. The social elites and many
in the business and professional classes had done rather well out of
empire.
The picture is, however, somewhat gloomier for the rest of the
population. Scotland was a grossly unequal society in the heyday of its
imperial success. R. D. Baxter’s calculations for 1867 suggest that around
70 per cent of ‘productive persons’ in Scotland, or almost a million people
in total, belonged to his two bottom categories of ‘lower skilled’ and
‘unskilled’ which consisted of male workers who earned on average below
£50 per annum.53 For many at this level short-term unemployment was
always a threat. Shipbuilding and the other capital goods industries were
subject to intense and savage fluctuations in 1884–7, 1894, 1903–5 and
1908. In that last year, unemployment among Clydeside skilled engineers
rose to nearly 20 per cent and among shipyard workers to almost a
quarter. In the four major cities there were large pools of seasonal and
casual labour, reckoned in the early 1900s at around 25 per cent of the
work force, who were engaged in jobs such as portering, catering and
street-selling where earnings were both paltry and unpredictable. For
most of the period between 1830 and 1914 Scottish industrial wage rates
51 Quoted in A. S. J. Bastier, The Imperial Banks (1929).
52 C. H. Lee, ‘Economic Progress: Wealth and Poverty’, in The Transformation of Scotland;
The Economy since 1700, ed. T. M. Devine, C. H. Lee and G. C. Peden (Edinburgh, 2005),
138–41.
53 T. C. Smout, A Century of the Scottish People 1830–1950 (1986), 109, 111.
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were lower than the English average. The Board of Trade estimated in
1912 that real wages (after taking into account living costs) were fully
10 per cent less in Scottish towns than in their counterparts in England.
Living costs on the other hand were higher.54 For Glasgow, recent work by
Richard Rodger has shown that the city’s inhabitants paid on average over
5 per cent more for their food and rent (which accounted for four-fifths
of the weekly working-class budget) than the population of Manchester,
Leeds, Salford and Nottingham – and this against a background of low
wages and volatile levels of employment on Clydeside.55
That Victorian industry was not a source of general prosperity
is confirmed by the examples of Scottish migration and housing in
this period. Precisely at the time when manufacturing was achieving
remarkable success in overseas markets the Scots, as noted above, were
leaving their native land in large numbers for the USA, Canada and
Australasia. Over 2 million people emigrated from Scotland between 1815
and 1939, a rate of outward movement that, per capita, was around one
and a half times that for England and Wales. This figure did not include
another 600,000who moved south of the border. In the 1850s, for instance,
the loss of young men from Scotland through emigration was considerably
greater than that experienced in the years of human carnage during the
First World War. Scotland was therefore almost alone among European
countries in having experienced both large-scale industrialisation and
a great outward movement of population. Most other societies prone to
high levels of emigration were poor rural economies. It seemed that many
Scots were voting with their feet in the search for better prospects than
were easily available to them at home.56
The condition of working-class housing confirmed that mass poverty
was a marked feature of Scotland’s age of empire and provoked endless
investigation and comment by the early twentieth century. From these
surveys it is abundantly clear that there was little real progress made
between 1870 and 1914. Clive Lee has recently concluded that, ‘by the
eve of the First World War Scotland stood on the brink of a housing
catastrophe’.57 In 1911 nearly 50 per cent of the Scottish population lived
in one- or two-roomed dwellings compared with just over 7 per cent
in England. Rents were significantly higher north of the Border, 10 per
cent greater than in Northumberland and Durham and almost 25 per
cent higher than the other English midland and northern counties. Over
54 T. M. Devine, ‘Industrialisation’, in Transformation, ed. Devine, Lee and Peden, 65–
6; idem, ‘Scotland’, in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, I : Industrialisation,
1700–1860, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (Cambridge, 2004), 388–416.
55 R. Rodger, ‘The Labour Force’, in Glasgow, ed. Fraser and Maver, 163–85.
56 T. M. Devine, ‘The Paradox of Scottish Emigration’, in Emigration, ed. Devine, 1–15.
57 C. H. Lee, Scotland and the United Kingdom (Manchester, 1995), 46.
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two million Scots in 1914, nearly half the population, lived more than two
persons to a room, the contemporary definition of ‘overcrowding’. The
housing problem reflected the reality of low and fluctuating incomes.
For families on limited earnings it made economic sense to take small
tenement flats at a rental sufficiently affordable to avoid arrears or
eviction. The problem was not so much availability of reasonable housing
as the ability of very many to pay for it. In 1914, for instance, in Glasgow
alone there were over 20,000 unoccupied houses or about a tenth of the
city’s total stock. The housing crisis was the most striking manifestation
of the depth of Glasgow’s poverty problem in the very decade when it
proclaimed itself ‘Second City of the Empire’.58
The conclusion must be that despite high levels of emigration Scotland
suffered from a chronic over-supply of labour in the heyday of empire.59
Low pay, underemployment, casual work and broken time were all
consistent with that pattern. Some Scots had grown wealthy but the
majority, despite modest gains in the later nineteenth century, remained
mired in poverty and endured a hard daily struggle to make ends meet.
The imperial economy was also building up potential problems for the
future. The dependency on low wages and semi-skilled or unskilled
labour placed the nation at a strategic disadvantage in the twentieth
century when home demand propelled the new consumer economy
with its focus on household good, motor vehicles, cycles, furniture
and electrical products. Scotland missed out on most of this ‘second
Industrial Revolution’. Even before 1914, the economic structure seemed
precarious. The heavy industries were all inter-connected, geared to
overseas markets, especially in the empire, and at risk from such mighty
competitors as the USA and Germany. The threat was especially real
because the Scots excelled at the making of simple capital goods such
as iron, steel, locomotives, bridges and the like which could easily be
rapidly imitated by emerging competitors. Imperial markets had therefore
left a flawed legacy by 1914 with serious consequences for Scotland
when international trade collapsed during several years between the
wars.
The manifestations of crisis were everywhere. Unemployment soared
to unprecedented levels in the early 1930s. In the industrial heartland
of the western lowlands, ‘The Workshop of the British Empire’, over a
quarter of the entire labour force, nearly 200,000 individuals were out
of work in 1932. New industries failed to develop and poor housing and
58 Census of Population, Scotland (1911), II , 566–7; S. Damer, ‘State, Class and Housing’, in
Housing, Social Policy and the State, ed. J. Melling (1980), 90.
59 The following two paragraphs are based on Devine, Scottish Nation, 201–66, 268–
72, and C. H. Lee, ‘Unbalanced Growth: Prosperity and Deprivation’, in Transformation,
ed. Devine, Lee and Peden, 209–24.
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slum conditions remained as bad as ever with overcrowding six times
greater in 1935 than south of the Border. Fears were expressed in the
business community of long-term economic decline and the erosion of
indigenous Scottish control as several failing firms were bought up by
financial interests from England. The unprecedented scale of emigration
in the 1930s intensified these anxieties. So great was the exodus that the
Scottish population actually fell by nearly 40,000 in that decade, the only
period since records began in which absolute decline between censuses
occurred.
Now, rather than being seen as evidence of the virility of an imperial
race, emigration was viewed as a scourge and confirmation of a terminal
national crisis. The novelist and poet, Edwin Muir, saw it as a ‘silent
clearance’ in which ‘the surroundings of industrialisation remain, but
industry itself is vanishing like a dream’. His apocalyptic vision was of a
country ‘being emptied of its population, its spirit, its wealth, industry,
art, intellect, and innate character’. As his fellow intellectual, George
Malcolm Thomson, put it: ‘The first fact about the Scot is that he is a
man eclipsed. The Scots are a dying race.’60
The most arresting illustration of the economic irrelevance of empire
was the experience between the wars of the Dundee jute industry. Already,
by the 1890s, Bengal had overtaken its Scottish parent to become the
world’s dominant centre for the jute sacks and hessian cloth which
carried the world’s foodstuffs and raw materials. Not surprisingly, in the
depressed market conditions in the 1930s, Dundee jute interests pleaded
on numerous occasions for tariffs to be imposed on the cheap imports
from Calcutta. But their pleas were in vain. Now it was Dundee which
looked more like the colony, and Bengal the metropole: ‘jute presents an
unusual example of a powerful industry emerging in a colonial setting
which almost destroyed the rival industry back in Britain while the empire
was still flourishing’.61
All this shattered faith in Scotland as the powerhouse of empire. Long
before decolonisation took place, imperial markets were no longer seen to
be of much benefit. Though the economy recovered during the Second
World War and the immediate post-war period, the fully enfranchised
masses now had other social priorities which could be delivered through
the ballot box. It was therefore hardly surprising that the majority of the
Scottish people reacted to the end of empire with indifference, despite
Scotland’s historic role before 1900 in imperial expansion. After 1945,
state intervention in industry, political commitment to full employment
and, above all, the Welfare State, slowly delivered security and material
60 Edwin Muir, Scottish Journey (Edinburgh, 1935), 110; G. M. Thomson, Caledonia or the
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improvement to the mass of Scots. These were the issues which now had
widespread popular appeal, especially in the light of Scotland’s social
history over the previous century. The age of empire may have passed,
but, ironically, the Union was now even more important than before. As
one of the poorer parts of the United Kingdom, Scotland was likely to gain
more than other regions from the introduction of an interventionist social
and economic policy which was being implemented in the very decade
that decolonisation accelerated through the independence of India.62
State support from cradle to grave became the new anchor of the Union
state.
62 C. H. Lee, ‘Unbalanced Growth: Prosperity and Deprivation’, in Transformation,
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